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Abstract
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game.
For the case of a ﬁnite game with pure strategies, we deﬁne a sequence
of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the
set of Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁles of the last game in the sequence.
This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for
the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of
a normal form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium proﬁles
coincides with the supercore for games with a ﬁnite number of Nash equi-
libria. For games with an inﬁnite number of Nash equilibria this need
not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd a binary relation
which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets.
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solution, von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set.
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11 Introduction
Stable sets were ﬁrst deﬁned by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) as a
solution to n-person cooperative games and have received a substantial deal of
attention in the literature of games (see, for instance, Lucas (1992) and another
references therein). A recent approach to the stable set theory and its connec-
tions with other solution concepts in game theory has been developed in the
book “The Theory of Social Situations” (TOSS) by Greenberg (1990). In its
Chapter 7 it is argued that when modeling social environments, normal form
games do not capture the notion of negotiation among players, while an advan-
tage of the approach proposed in TOSS is that the consequences of diﬀerent
types of negotiations among players may be analyzed. One of the negotiations
considered by Greenberg is the so called individual contingent threat (ICT) sit-
uation, where each single player can object to the prevailing outcome and can
threaten the others by stating that she will use a diﬀerent strategy.1 The ICT
situation can be used to generate a system in which the strategy proﬁles of a
normal form game are the elements of the set and the binary relation deﬁned
on that set accounts only for the proﬁtable single deviations.
With respect to the existence of von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN&M)
stable sets for systems associated to an ICT situation of a ﬁnite normal form
game, Greenberg shows that it is guaranteed in the following two cases: (i)
when there are at most two players, and (ii) when there are n players, each one
with a set of at most two strategies.2 Unfortunately, however, these existence
theorems cannot be generalized for any number of players or strategies. Even in
the case of games with Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy proﬁles (Nash (1951)),
the existence of a vN&M stable set is not assured.3 Along this line of research,
Arce (1994) studies the vN&M stable sets for a 3-person prisoners’ dilemma
and Nakanishi (2001, 2002) shows the existence of vN&M stable sets for the
n-person prisoners’ dilemma with continuous strategies and also for some other
games.
1Negotiations where players can jointly object to the prevailing outcome and can threaten
the others by stating that they will use another strategies are considered by Greenberg (1989,
1990) and Kahn and Mookherjee (1992).
2Greenberg (1990), pp. 100-101, Theorems 7.4.5 and 7.4.6.
3Greenberg (1990), p. 102, Example 7.4.8.
2Subsolutions were deﬁned by Roth (1976) as a generalization of the vN&M
stable sets. Interestingly enough, this notion has not been extensively considered
in the game theory literature. However, the supercore is a distinct subsolution
and does have a better performance than the vN&M stable sets for the particular
setting considered in this paper. Thus, our objective is to analyze the supercore
as a solution for systems associated to an ICT situation of a ﬁnite normal form
game in pure strategies and of its mixed extension.
For the pure strategies case, the supercore of the system associated to an
ICT situation contains at least the NE strategy proﬁles. In particular, given
a normal form game we derive a sequence of games and we ﬁnd that the set
of NE strategy proﬁles of the last game in the sequence exactly coincides with
the supercore of the system associated to the original game. As a result, this
procedure allows the identiﬁcation of those games in which the supercore selects
exactly the NE strategy proﬁles. With regard to the content of the supercore,
this solution may be interpreted as the outcome of a dynamic model of sequential
selection of strategy proﬁles. From this perspective, the supercore is formed by
the union of NE and the “NE protected strategy proﬁles” of each game in the
sequence.
We illustrate the previous results with a numerical example and we also
characterize the supercore of the system associated to the n-person prisoners’
dilemma. In the last case, the supercore is the unique vN&M stable set and
it is formed by the strategy proﬁle where all players choose to defect and by
the strategy proﬁles in which the number of players who choose to cooperate is
even.
For the case of a system associated to the mixed extension of a ﬁnite normal
form game the results are noteworthy. One of the ﬁrst criticisms of the von
Neumann and Morgenstern (vN&M) stable sets was made by Harsanyi (1974)
who argued that this notion is unsatisfactory because it neglects the destabiliz-
ing eﬀect of the indirect dominance relation between alternatives of the stable
set. As we shall show this shortcoming is not shared by the supercore when
applying to generic games. More precisely, we ﬁnd that the supercore exactly
coincides with the set of NE strategy proﬁles for normal form games that have a
3ﬁnite number of NE proﬁles. However, a simple example shows that this result
no longer holds for the case of games with an inﬁnite number of NE strategy
proﬁles.
To obtain the equivalence between the two sets we proceed in a parallel
fashion to Kalai and Schmeidler (1977). These authors ﬁnd, under the same
binary relation we have considered in this paper, that the admissible set may
be “too large” since it may coincide with the entire space of mixed strategies.
They also show the coincidence of the admissible set and the set of NE under
a suitable dominance relation. As indicated above in our case, the equivalence
between the supercore and the set of NE strategy proﬁles is obtained for the
mixed extensions of almost all normal form games. Yet, it is not diﬃcult to
ﬁnd a weaker binary relation which guarantees the exact coincidence of these
two sets for the mixed extension of every normal form game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the prelimi-
naries. In Section 3 we introduce the ICT situation associated to a normal form
game, we deﬁne the sequence of normal form games which allows the determi-
nation of the supercore, and we present the characterization of the supercore
for the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. Section 4 studies the supercore associ-
ated to the mixed extension of a game under two diﬀerent binary relations. An
appendix with several proofs concludes the paper.
42 Preliminaries
These preliminaries introduce the solution concepts for an abstract system that
will be used in the paper, and also recall the deﬁnitions of a ﬁnite normal form
game, its mixed extension and the Nash equilibrium solution.
An abstract system is a pair (X,R), where X is a set of elements and R is
an irreﬂexive binary relation deﬁned on X. The relation R reads “dominates.”
Hence, if for two elements x,x0 in X we have xRx0, then we say that x dominates
x0.
For any x ∈ X, let D(x) denote the dominion of x, i.e., D(x)={x0 ∈ X :
xRx0}. Given any subset A of X, we deﬁne the following sets: D(A)=
S
x∈A
D(x),
U(A)=X −D(A),4 and P(A)=U(A) − A.
A subsolution of (X,R) is a subset A of X such that A ⊂U (A),5 and
A = U2(A), where U2(A)=U(U(A)). The condition A ⊂U (A) is known as
the internal stability condition. With regard to the condition A = U2(A), Roth
(1976, p. 44) provides the following interpretation:
.. every point in U(A) − A is dominated by some other point in
the same set and the entire set, thus “overrules” itself leaving only
the set as “sound.”
In words, if A is a subsolution then P(A) ⊂D (P(A)).
The intersection of all subsolutions of (X,R) is also a subsolution which is
known as the supercore.
A subset A ⊂ X is a vN&M stable set of (X,R)i fA = U(A). Thus, a vN&M
stable set is characterized by the internal stability condition A ⊂U(A), and by
U(A) ⊂ A, known as the external stability condition. Clearly, a vN&M stable
set is a subsolution that satisﬁes P(A)=∅.
A subset A ⊂ X is the core of (X,R)i fA = U(X).
A ﬁnite normal form game ΓN is a triple <N ,{Si}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N > where
N = {1,...,n} is the ﬁnite set of players, Si is the ﬁnite set of strategies for
player i and ui : S = ×i∈NSi −→ R is player i’s payoﬀ function.
4The symbol − stands for the diﬀerence binary relation.
5The symbol ⊂ means weakly contained while ( means strictly contained.
5A strategy of player i, b si is a best response to s−i if for all si ∈ Si, ui(b si,
s−i) ≥ ui(si,s −i) where s−i =( s1,...,si−1,s i+1,...,sn).
Let s =( s1,...,sn) denote a strategy proﬁle. Then, s∗ =( s∗
1,...,s∗
n)i sa
Nash equilibrium in ΓN if s∗
i is a best response to s∗
−i for all i ∈ N.
A mixed extension of the game ΓN is a triple <N , {∆Si}i∈N,{Ui}i∈N >
where ∆Si is the simplex of the mixed strategies for player i, and Ui :∆ ( S)=
×i∈N∆Si −→ R, assigns to σ ∈ ∆(S) the expected value under ui of the lottery
over S that is induced by σ so that Ui(σ)=
P
s∈S
(
Q
j∈N
σj(sj))ui(s).
Let σ denote a mixed strategy proﬁle. Then, σ∗ =( σ∗
1,...,σ∗
n)i saNash
equilibrium in the mixed extension of the game ΓN if σ∗
i is a best response to
σ∗
−i =( σ∗
1,...,σ∗
i−1,σ∗
i+1,...,σ∗
n) for all i ∈ N.
3 The Supercore of a Finite Normal Form Game
in Pure Strategies
This section has 3 subsections. In the ﬁrst one, we deﬁne the system associated
to an ICT situation of a normal form game. In the second we deﬁne a sequence
of normal form games that allows the determination of the supercore of the
system associated to an ICT situation of a normal form game in pure strategies.
The third subsection concludes with a numerical example that illustrates these
results and also includes the characterization of the supercore for the n−person
prisoners’ dilemma.
3.1 A System Associated to an ICT Situation of a Finite
Normal Form Game
The application of the approach developed in TOSS to the normal form of a
game allows the consideration of diﬀerent types of negotiation among players,
and their possible consequences. In particular, the negotiation in which each
player may deviate from a proposed strategy proﬁle unilaterally is the one that
we study in this paper. This notion of negotiation is formalized by ICT situation.
Let us start with a description of the negotiation procedure:
A strategy proﬁle, say s, is proposed to players. If all individuals openly
consent to follow s, then s will be adopted. If player i objects to s, then she has
6to openly declare that if the remaining players stick to the speciﬁed proﬁle s,
then she will choose s0
i instead of si (contingent threat of player i). Thus, each
single player can object to the prevailing proﬁle and can threaten the others by
saying that she will choose another strategy. We say that player i induces s0
from s when she modiﬁes proﬁle s into proﬁle s0. Any player other than player
i can then counter the new upcoming strategy proﬁle induced by player i. The
set of proﬁles that player i can induce from s is denoted as:
γi(s)={s0 ∈ S : s0
j = sj for all j 6= i, j ∈ N}.
Thus, γi determines an inducement correspondence for player i from S into
itself. Once we have γi we can deﬁne the ICT situation associated with ΓN as:
ΓN
γ ≡ (N,S,{ui}i∈N,{γi}i∈N).
We are now ready to deﬁne the system associated to an ICT situation of a game
in normal form.
Deﬁnition 1 An individual dominance system associated to ΓN
γ is a pair (S,∠),
where ∠ is the binary relation deﬁned on S as follows:
s0∠s if there exists i ∈ N such that s0 ∈ γi(s) and ui(s0) >u i(s).
This means that s0 dominates s if s0 is derived from s via a deviation of a
player i who is better oﬀ under s0 than under s.
(Hereafter, the individual dominance system will be simply called as the
system whenever no confusion is possible)
3.2 A Procedure to Compute the Supercore of (S,∠)
Let us consider a game ΓN with at least one NE strategy proﬁle. This assump-
tion is not restrictive since the supercore of (S,∠) for a game ΓN with no NE
strategy proﬁle is the empty set (Roth, (1976)).
Let S∗ be the set of NE strategy proﬁles of the game ΓN and let s∗ ∈ S∗.
Starting from s∗, consider the set of strategy proﬁles obtained by a deviation of
a player who obtains a lower payoﬀ than the payoﬀ provided by s∗. This set is
the dominion of s∗, that is, D(s∗)={s ∈ S : s ∈ γi(s∗) and ui(s∗) >u i(s) for
7some i ∈ N}. Hence, it is clear that moving from s into s∗ is always proﬁtable
for player i. Thus, the dominion of S∗ is D(S∗)=
S
s∗∈S∗
D(s∗).
Let υi(ΓN) be the lowest payoﬀ for player i in the game ΓN. That is,
υi(ΓN) = min{ui(s): s ∈ S}. Denote by υ(ΓN)=( υ1(ΓN),...,υn(ΓN)) the
vector of lowest payoﬀs.
In what follows we oﬀer a procedure to determine the supercore of (S,∠).
The basic intuition for this procedure is the following. Starting from the game
ΓN, we deﬁne a new game ΓN
1 with the same set of players and strategies for
every player and with the players’ payoﬀs modiﬁed in the following way: the
payoﬀ for each player at every proﬁle in D(S∗) is equal to his lowest payoﬀ in the
game ΓN, while the payoﬀs corresponding to the remaining strategy proﬁles are
maintained. The idea behind this modiﬁcation is to take any power away from
the strategy proﬁles dominated by the NE strategy proﬁles. By assigning them
the lowest payoﬀs of the game, these strategy proﬁles cannot longer dominate
any proﬁle.
With this modiﬁcation in hand, we may verify whether or not game ΓN
1 has
any additional NE strategy proﬁles than those that game ΓN has. If ΓN
1 has
new NE strategy proﬁles then a game ΓN
2 can be deﬁned, and the procedure
may continue iteratively in this manner.
The procedure described generates a sequence of games
￿
ΓN
t
￿∞
t=0 and a se-
quence of systems h(S,∠t)i
∞
t=0 deﬁned inductively as follows:
(i) ΓN
0 =Γ N and (S,∠0)=( S,∠).
(ii) For t ≥ 1, ΓN
t = <N ,{Si}i∈N ,{ut
i}i∈N >, where:
ut
i(s)=



υi(ΓN)i f s ∈D (S∗
t−1)i n( S,∠t−1)
u
t−1
i (s) otherwise,
where S∗
t−1 denotes the set of NE strategy proﬁles of ΓN
t−1, and (S,∠t) is the
associated system to ΓN
t in which ∠t is the binary relation on S given by:
s0∠ts if there is a player i ∈ N such that s0 ∈ γi(s) and ut
i(s0) >u t
i(s).
Formally, this procedure can be summarized as follows:
8Step 0: Let ΓN
0 =Γ N. Compute S∗
0 and determine D(S∗
0)i n( S,∠0).
Game ΓN
1 is generated according to the player’s payoﬀ function
￿
u1
i
￿
i∈N, and the system (S,∠1) is generated by the relation ∠1.
Step t: Let be the game ΓN
t . Compute S∗
t .
If S∗
t = S∗
t−1, then the procedure concludes.
If S∗
t−1 ( S∗
t , determine D(S∗
t )i n( S,∠t). Game ΓN
t+1 is gener-
ated according to the player’s payoﬀ function
￿
u
t+1
i
￿
i∈N, and the
system (S,∠t+1) is generated by the relation ∠t+1.
Given that S is ﬁnite, there exists a k ∈ N such that S∗
t 6= S∗
t+1 for
all t =0 ,...k − 2 and S∗
k = S∗
k−1.
Now, we can establish the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Let S∗
k be the set of NE strategy proﬁles of the game ΓN
k . Then S∗
k
is the supercore of (S,∠).
Proof. We will prove that the following two conditions hold:
(i) S∗
k is a subsolution of (S,∠).
(ii) Any other subsolution S of (S,∠) contains S∗
k.
(i) We show that S∗
k satisﬁes in (S,∠) the conditions S∗
k ⊂U(S∗
k) and S∗
k =
U2(S∗
k).
Given the way the sequence of games < ΓN
0 ,...,ΓN
k > is constructed, we can
write that for each s ∈ S and for all i ∈ N
uk
i (s)=



υi(ΓN)i f s ∈D (S∗
k)i n( S,∠)
ui(s) otherwise.
(1)
Clearly, the NE strategy proﬁles of ΓN
k in the system (S,∠) cannot dominate
each other and can only be dominated by the strategy proﬁles belonging to
D(S∗
k). Hence, S∗
k ⊂U (S∗
k) and S∗
k ⊂U (U(S∗
k)). Now, let us assume that
there is a strategy proﬁle s ∈U (U(S∗
k)) such that s/ ∈ S∗
k. Then s will be
dominated in (S,∠k) by some s0 ∈ S. Therefore s0∠ks, and from (1) it follows
that s0 / ∈D (S∗
k)i n( S,∠). Since s,s0 / ∈D (S∗
k) the players’ payoﬀs corresponding
to the proﬁles s and s0 are the same in the games ΓN
k and ΓN, it follows that s0∠s.
9Therefore, s ∈D (U(S∗
k)), which contradicts that s ∈U (U(S∗
k)). Consequently,
S∗
k = U(U(S∗
k)).
(ii) We argue by contradiction. Suppose that for some subsolution S of
(S,∠), S∗
k 6⊂ S. Now, let us consider S∗
0 ⊂ ... ⊂ S∗
k and deﬁne l = min{t : S∗
t 6⊂
S, t =0 ,...,k}. Since S∗
0 is the core of (S,∠), it is included in any subsolution.
Therefore, l 6=0 .
Let s ∈ S∗
l such that s/ ∈ S. Then, either s ∈D (S)o rs ∈P (S)i n( S,∠).
Given that s is a Nash equilibrium in ΓN
l , it can only be dominated by some
strategy proﬁles in D(S∗
l−1) and, by the deﬁnition of l, we have that S is a
subsolution such that S∗
l−1 ⊂ S so that s/ ∈D (S). Hence, s ∈P (S). Now,
given that P(S) ⊂D (P(S)), there exists s0 ∈P (S) such that s0∠s. However,
given that s0 ∈D (S∗
l−1) and S∗
l−1 ⊂ S then s0 / ∈P (S). Thus, we have reached
a contradiction.
Corollary 1 The core of (S,∠) coincides with the supercore of (S,∠) if and
only if S∗
0 = S∗
1.
Proof. Given that S∗
0 is the core of (S,∠) the result follows directly from
Theorem 1.
One question that readily arises is the type of proﬁles included in the su-
percore. The content of this set for (S,∠) may be interpreted as the result
of a dynamic model of sequential selection of strategy proﬁles.6 Starting from
ΓN
0 and S∗
0, assume that the strategy proﬁles in D(S∗
0) “lose power,” so that
the payoﬀs of the players in these proﬁles are replaced by their corresponding
lowest payoﬀs in the game. By taking into account these “lowered payoﬀs”, we
determine ΓN
1 , which is a game where the proﬁles in D(S∗
0) cannot dominate
any proﬁle. Thus, starting from ΓN
1 , we determine the set of NE proﬁles S∗
1.
Clearly the strategy proﬁles belonging to S∗
1 − S∗
0 are dominated only by some
proﬁles in D(S∗
0). We call them “NE protected proﬁles”.
In general, given the game ΓN
t , t =1 ,...,k, S∗
t is formed by the set S∗
t−1 and
by those NE proﬁles protected by S∗
t−1. Therefore, we may establish that the
supercore is formed by S∗
0 and the NE protected proﬁles of each game in the
rest of the sequence.
6See the dynamic model presented by Roth (1978).
103.3 Two Examples
We ﬁrst present a simple example illustrating some previous results and then
characterize the supercore for the n−person prisoners’ dilemma.
Example 1. Consider the following game ΓN :
b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 6,6 5,5 1,3 2,2
a2 3,4 4,4 7,2 1,3
a3 6,2 2,3 8,8 6,2
a4 2,3 2,5 9,4 2,5
Step 0: Let ΓN
0 =Γ N. The vector of lowest payoﬀs is (υ1(ΓN),υ 2(ΓN)) = (1,2).
The set of NE strategy proﬁles of ΓN
0 is S∗
0 = {(a1,b 1)} and the dominion of
S∗
0 is D(S∗
0)={(a1,b 2),(a1,b 3),(a1,b 4),(a2,b 1),(a4,b 1)}. Replacing the payoﬀs
of the proﬁles in D(S∗
0)b y( 1 ,2) game ΓN
1 is obtained.
Step 1: Let the game ΓN
1 be:
b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 6,6 1,2 1,2 1,2
a2 1,2 4,4 7,2 1,3
a3 6,2 2,3 8,8 6,2
a4 1,2 2,5 9,4 2,5
Here, we have S∗
1 = {(a1,b 1),(a2,b 2)}, and D({(a1,b 1),(a2,b 2)})=D({(a1,b 1)})∪
{(a2,b 3),(a2,b 4),(a3,b 2),(a4,b 2)}. Replacing the payoﬀs of the proﬁles in D(S∗
1)
by (1,2) game ΓN
2 is obtained.
Step 2: Let the game ΓN
2 be:
b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 6,6 1,2 1,2 1,2
a2 1,2 4,4 1,2 1,2
a3 6,2 1,2 8,8 6,2
a4 1,2 1,2 9,4 2,5
The set of NE strategy proﬁles of ΓN
2 is S∗
2 = {(a1,b 1),(a2,b 2)}. Since
S∗
2 = S∗
1 the procedure ends.
11This procedure generates the sequence of games
￿
ΓN
0 ,ΓN
1 ,ΓN
2
￿
. The set
of NE strategy proﬁles of the game ΓN
2 is the supercore for (S,∠). The two
vN&M stable sets of the system (S,∠) are {(a1,b 1),(a2,b 2),(a3,b 3),(a4,b 4)}
and {(a1,b 1),(a2,b 2),(a4,b 3),(a3,b 4)}.
Example 2 The Supercore for the n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma:7
The n-person prisoners’ dilemma represents situations where the cooperative
outcome, all players selecting cooperation, cannot be attained as a NE. Let us
formally deﬁne this game.8 Let N be the set of players. Assume that every
player has two actions C (cooperation) and D (defection). The payoﬀ of player
i is given by:
fi(a|r), a = C,D, and r =0 ,...,n − 1,
where a is player i’s action and r is the number of other players who select
action C.
The following three assumptions on the payoﬀ function deﬁne an n-person
prisoners’ dilemma:
• A.1 Every player is better oﬀ by choosing D than by choosing C. That
is, for all i ∈ N: fi(C |r) <f i(D|r) for all r =0 ,...,n − 1.
• A.2 If all players choose D, then the payoﬀ for each and every player is
worse than the payoﬀ they would obtain if they all chose C. That is, for
all i ∈ N: fi(C |n − 1)>f i(D|0).
• A.3 The payoﬀ of player i, given her action, increases as the number of
other players that select C increases; that is, fi(C |r) and fi(D|r) are
increasing functions of r.
Under these assumptions it is straightforward to see that the unique NE
strategy proﬁle is that in which all players select D.
Let (Spd,∠) denote the system associated to the n-person prisoners’ dilemma.
7Arce (1994) studies the vN&M stable set for a 3-person prisoners’ dilemma. Using sets of
continuous strategies for all players Nakanishi (2001) shows that a vN&M stable set always
exists for an n-person prisoner’s dilemma.
8Here, we follow Nishihara’s (1997) formulation of the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. See
also Okada (1993).
12Theorem 2 The supercore of the n-prisoners’ dilemma is the unique vN&M
stable set of (Spd,∠), and it is formed by (D,...,D) and by those strategy proﬁles
such that the number of players who choose C is even.
Proof. Using the procedure described above we have the sequence of games
￿
ΓN
0 ,...,ΓN
k
￿
that is derived in the following way. Step 0: Let ΓN
0 =Γ N. The
set of NE strategy proﬁles is S∗
0 = {(D,...,D)} and by A.1 the dominion of S∗
0
is D(S∗
0)={s ∈ Spd : si = C and sj = D, for all j 6= i.}. Step t (t ≥ 1): Take
the game ΓN
t . The set of NE strategy proﬁles is S∗
t = S∗
t−1 ∪ e St where e St is
the set of proﬁles such that exactly 2t players choose C. The dominion of S∗
t is
D(S∗
t )=D(S∗
t−1) ∪D (e St) where D( e St) is the set of strategy proﬁles such that
exactly (2t + 1) players choose C. Step k: Since S∗
k−1 = S∗
k, it must happen
that k = n
2 +1i fn is even, and k = integer part of n
2 plus 1 if n is odd. It
is clear that Spd = S∗
k ∪D(S∗
k). Hence, we may conclude that the supercore of
(Spd,∠) is a vN&M stable set and it is obviously unique.
Lastly, we conclude this section with two comments:
1. A drawback of the supercore when applied to this setting is that, in
general, it may not include any eﬃcient strategy proﬁle, that is those proﬁles in
which there is no other strategy proﬁle where all players are strictly better oﬀ.
Example 1 illustrates the case where the supercore does not include any of the
two eﬃcient proﬁles, (a3,b 3) and (a4,b 3). In the n-person prisoners’ dilemma
game, however, the inclusion in the supercore of some eﬃcient strategy proﬁles
is guaranteed. Notice that: (i) if the number of players in the game is even
then the strategy proﬁle (C,...,C) is in the supercore, and (ii) if the number of
players is odd then all those proﬁles with exactly one player choosing D are in
the supercore. It is easy to see that A.1, A.2 and A.3 guarantee that (C,...,C)
and the strategy proﬁles in which exactly one player chooses D are eﬃcient.
2. As it is well known, a strategy is rationalizable if it survives the iterated
removal of strategies that are never best response (see Bernheim (1984) and
Pearce (1984)). It turns out that the selected strategy proﬁles by the super-
core are not always rationalizable. For example, the supercore for the 2-person
prisoners’ dilemma is the set {(D,D),(C,C)}, while D is the only rationalizable
strategy.
134 The Supercore of the Mixed Extension of a
Finite Normal Form Game
In this section we study the supercore of a system associated to the mixed
extension of a normal form game. We ﬁnd that if the number of NE proﬁles is
ﬁnite then the supercore of the system coincides with the set of NE of the mixed
extension of the game. A simple example shows that this is no longer the case
if the number of NE strategy proﬁles is inﬁnite.
An ICT situation of the mixed extension of a game ΓN is a 4-tuple hN,∆(S),
(Ui)i∈N,(γi)i∈Ni where γi is the correspondence from ∆(S) into itself deﬁned
by
γi(σ)={σ0 ∈ ∆(S):σ0
j = σj for all j 6= i, j ∈ N}.
Thus, γi(σ) is the set of proﬁles which may be induced by player i from σ.
Deﬁnition 2 An individual dominance system associated to an ICT situation
of the mixed extension of a game ΓN is a pair (∆(S),∠) where ∠ is the binary
relation deﬁned on ∆(S) such that:
σ0∠σ if there exits i ∈ N such that σ0 ∈ γi(σ) and Ui(σ0) >U i(σ).
Let Σ∗ be the set of NE strategy proﬁles of the mixed extension of the game
ΓN and let σ∗ ∈ Σ∗. The dominion of σ∗ is D(σ∗)={σ ∈ ∆(S):σ ∈ γi(σ∗)
and Ui(σ∗) >U i(σ) for some i ∈ N}. Then, the dominion of Σ∗ will be
D(Σ∗)=
S
σ∗∈Σ∗
D(σ∗).
Theorem 3 If Σ∗ is ﬁnite then Σ∗ is the supercore of (∆(S),∠).
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that Σ∗ is a subsolution of (∆(S),∠), that is that
Σ∗ ⊂U(Σ∗) and Σ∗ = U2(Σ∗).
Given that Σ∗ ⊂U (Σ∗), if Σ∗ = U(Σ∗) then Σ∗ = U2(Σ∗) and Σ∗ is a
subsolution. If Σ∗ 6= U(Σ∗) we have to show that P(Σ∗) ⊂D (P(Σ∗)), which is
equivalent to the condition Σ∗ = U2(Σ∗) given that Σ∗ ⊂U 2(Σ∗).
Let σ ∈P(Σ∗). We will show that σ ∈D (P(Σ∗)).
Since σ/ ∈ Σ∗ then σi will not be the best response to σ−i for some player
i. Therefore, there exists a proﬁle σ0 ∈ γi(σ) such that Ui(σ0) >U i(σ). Now,
14set σλ = λσ +( 1− λ)σ0 for all λ ∈ [0,1). By the linearity of Ui we have
Ui(σλ) >U i(σ), and since σλ ∈ γi(σ), it follows that σλ∠σ for all λ ∈ [0,1).
Thus, σλ dominates σ, and σλ / ∈ Σ∗ given that σ ∈P(Σ∗).
It remains to prove that σλ ∈P (Σ∗) for some λ:I f σλ ∈D (Σ∗) for all
λ, then there exists σ∗
λ ∈ Σ∗ such that σ∗
λ ∈ γj(σλ) for some player j, and
Uj(σ∗
λ) >U j(σλ). If j = i, we have Ui(σ∗
λ) >U i(σλ) >U i(σ). Hence, σ∗
λ
will dominate σ, which implies that σ ∈D (Σ∗). Otherwise, the subset {σ∗
λ:
λ ∈ [0,1)} of Σ∗ will be inﬁnite, which contradicts the fact that Σ∗ is ﬁnite.
Therefore, σλ ∈P(Σ∗) for some λ, and since σλ∠σ it follows that σ ∈D (P(Σ∗)).
Lastly, since the supercore is the intersection of all subsolutions and any
subsolution contains Σ∗, Theorem 3 follows.
The result above does not longer hold when the mixed extension of the game
ΓN has an inﬁnite number of NE strategy proﬁles. The following example illus-
trates that non-Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁles may belong to the supercore
of (∆(S),∠).
Example 3 Consider the mixed extension of the following game:
b1 b2
a1 1,0 1,1
a2 -1,1 1,0
Let p be the probability that player 1 chooses a1 and let q be the probability
that player 2 chooses b1. It is easy to check that the set of Nash equilibria is
Σ∗ = {(p,1− p,0 ,1 ):1
2 ≤ p ≤ 1}. The dominion of the set of Nash equilibria
is D(Σ∗)={(p,1− p, q,1− q): 1
2 <p≤ 1, 0 <q≤ 1} and the set of proﬁles
undominated by the set of Nash equilibria excluding them is P(Σ∗)={(p,
1 − p, q,1− q):0≤ p ≤ 1
2,0<q≤ 1}∪{ (p,1 − p,0,1) : 0 ≤ p<1
2}. It is
straightforward to show that the supercore of (∆(S),∠)i sΣ ∗∪{(1
2, 1
2, q,1−q):
0 <q≤ 1}∪{ (p,1 − p,0,1) : 0 ≤ p<1
2}.
The example above suggests that the equivalence between the supercore
and the set of NE strategy proﬁles for the mixed extension of a game might
perhaps require the use of a weaker dominance relation than the one previously
considered in this paper.
15In this regard, it is interesting to consider the work by Kalai and Schmeidler
(1977). These authors study the admissible set in various bargaining situations.
In particular, they study the admissible set for the mixed extension of a game
under diﬀerent binary relations. Using the same binary relation we have con-
sidered in this paper, they ﬁnd that the admissible set may be “too large” (for
instance, in the 2-person matching pennies game the admissible set coincides
with the entire space of mixed strategies) and show that the coincidence of the
admissible set and the set of NE proﬁles holds under a somewhat diﬀerent bi-
nary relation. This relation embeds the notion of possible reply, where each
player rationalizes her reply taking into account the possible rationalization of
the remaining players.
In our case, as we have shown in Theorem 3, the equivalence of the supercore
and the set of NE proﬁles is obtained for mixed extensions of almost all normal
form games (in particular it holds for generic games). To obtain the exact
coincidence between these two sets we introduce a new dominance relation.
Deﬁnition 3 Let (∆(S),<<) be the weakly individual dominance system asso-
ciated to the mixed extension of the game ΓN, where << is the binary relation
deﬁned on ∆(S) as follows: σ0 << σ if there exists a player i ∈ N such that
σ0 ∈ γi(σ) and either Ui(σ0) >U i(σ)o rUi(σ0)=Ui(σ) whenever σ0 ∈ Σ∗ and
σ/ ∈ Σ∗.
This dominance relation between proﬁles may intuitively be justiﬁed as fol-
lows: As with the earlier relation, any feasible and strictly proﬁtable deviation
between strategy proﬁles will always occur. In addition, Ui(σ0)=Ui(σ) for
σ0 ∈ Σ∗, σ/ ∈ Σ∗ means that starting from a non-NE proﬁle, a player when
facing a feasible NE proﬁle that gives her the same payoﬀ, prefers to deviate to
that NE proﬁle where she is assuring herself her current payoﬀ. This may hap-
pen because she knows that at the non-NE proﬁle, there is at least one player
who will surely deviate to another proﬁle, and this move might give her a lower
payoﬀ than the current one. Consequently, this lack of farsightedness about
future payoﬀs implies that an equality in the payoﬀs between non-NE strategy
proﬁles is not a suﬃcient reason for a player to deviate.
We establish two lemmas before showing the equivalence between the set of
NE and the supercore.
16Lemma 1 Σ∗ is a compact subset of ∆(S).
Proof. See the appendix.￿
Lemma 2 D(Σ∗) ∪ Σ∗ in (∆(S),<<) is a closed subset of ∆(S).
Proof. See the appendix.￿
Finally, we will show the equivalence between the set of NE strategy proﬁles
and the supercore of (∆(S),<<).
Theorem 4 Σ∗ is the supercore of (∆(S),<<).
Proof. See the appendix.
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19Appendix
Proofs omitted from the text are provided below.
Proof of Lemma 1
We ﬁrst prove that Σ∗ is closed.
Let us consider a sequence {σ∗
n}n∈N ⊂ Σ∗ such that limn→∞σ∗
n = σ∗.W e
will see that σ∗ ∈ Σ∗. Since σ∗
n ∈ Σ∗ then (σ∗
n)i is a best response to (σ∗
n)−i for
each i ∈ N. That is,
Ui((σ∗
n)i,( σ∗
n)−i) ≥ Ui(σi,( σ∗
n)−i) for all σi ∈ ∆(Si).
Taking the limit on each side of the last expression we have:
limn→∞Ui((σ∗
n)i,( σ∗
n)−i) ≥ limn→∞Ui(σi,( σ∗
n)−i) for all σi ∈ ∆(Si).
Since limn→∞σ∗
n = σ∗, and Ui is a continuous function it follows that:
Ui((σ∗
i , σ∗
−i) ≥ Ui(σi, σ∗
−i) for all σi ∈ ∆(Si).
Therefore, σ∗
i is player’s i best response to σ∗
−i for every i ∈ N. In other words,
σ∗ is a NE strategy proﬁle. Lastly, given that Σ∗ is a closed subset of the
compact set ∆(S) we conclude that Σ∗ is compact. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2
By Lemma 1, Σ∗ is closed. Hence, it is suﬃcient to prove that the closure
of D(Σ∗) is contained in D(Σ∗) ∪ Σ∗.
Let us consider a sequence {σn}n∈N ⊂D (Σ∗) such that limn→∞σn = σ.W e
will see that σ ∈D (Σ∗) ∪ Σ∗.
Since σn ∈D (Σ∗), there is a NE strategy proﬁle σ∗
n such that for some player
i ∈ N, σ∗
n ∈ γi(σn) and Ui(σ∗
n) ≥ Ui(σn). Taking into account that the set Σ∗
is compact (Lemma 1) and that {σ∗
n}n∈N ⊂ Σ∗, we can assume without loss of
generality the existence of a proﬁle σ∗ ∈ Σ∗ such that limn→∞σ∗
n = σ∗. (If this
is not the case then we replace that sequence by the appropriate subsequence).
Now, set N(i)={n ∈ N : σ∗
n ∈ γi(σn)} for each i ∈ N. It is clear that for
some j ∈ N the set N(j) is countable. Hence, we can choose the subsequences
{σ0
n}n∈N of {σn}n∈N and {σ∗0
n}n∈N of {σ∗
n}n∈N such that (σ∗)0
n ∈ γj(σ0
n) and
20Uj((σ∗)0
n) ≥ Uj(σ0
n) for all n ∈ N. Therefore, taking the limit on each side in
the last expression we have:
limn→∞Uj((σ∗)0
n) ≥ limn→∞Uj(σ0
n).
Since limn→∞((σ∗)0
n)=σ∗, limn→∞(σ0
n)=σ, and Uj is a continuous func-
tion, we have Uj(σ∗) ≥ Uj(σ). Given that σ∗ ∈ γj(σ) it follows that if σ/ ∈ Σ∗
then σ∗ << σ, so either σ ∈D (Σ∗)o rσ ∈ Σ∗. Thus, Lemma 2 follows. ￿
Proof of Theorem 4
Given that any subsolution of (∆(S),<<) contains Σ∗, it is suﬃcient to
prove that Σ∗ is a subsolution. That is, Σ∗ ⊂U(Σ∗) and Σ∗ = U2(Σ∗).
Clearly, Σ∗ ⊂U (Σ∗). If Σ∗ = U(Σ∗) then Σ∗ is a vN&M stable set, and
thus Σ∗ is a subsolution. So, let us assume that P(Σ∗) 6= ∅. We must show that
Σ∗ = U2(Σ∗) or equivalently that P(Σ∗) ⊂D (P(Σ∗)).
Let σ ∈P (Σ∗). Since σ/ ∈ Σ∗, σi is not the best response to σ−i for some
player i. Hence, there is a σ0 ∈ γi(σ) such that Ui(σ0) >U i(σ).
Now, if σ0 ∈P(Σ∗) then we obtain the desired result. If this is not the case
then, set σλ = λσ +( 1− λ)σ0 for all λ ∈ [0,1). By the linearity of Ui we have
that Ui(σλ) >U i(σ), and since σλ ∈ γi(σ), it follows that σλ << σ.
By Lemma 2 we know that D(Σ∗)∪Σ∗ is a closed subset of ∆(S). Therefore,
P(Σ∗) is an open subset of ∆(S). This implies that there exists an ε>0
such that the open ball B(σ,ε) ⊂P (Σ∗). By choosing a λ ∈ (0,1) such that
σλ ∈ B(σ,ε) we have that σλ ∈P (Σ∗). Since σλ << σ, we conclude that
σ ∈D (P(Σ∗)) and Theorem 4 yields. ￿
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